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Abstract 
 
Research summary: We use a large-sample inductive approach to explore the impact of two 
social liberalization policies (legalization of same-sex civil unions and medical marijuana) 
and one anti-liberalization policy (passage of abortion restrictions) on innovation. First, we 
show that liberalization policies increase state-level patenting while the anti-liberalization 
policy reduces patenting. Next, we examine three possible mechanisms that could explain the 
findings. The results suggest that liberalization policies can increase the collaboration 
diversity of inventors, and hence the rate, novelty, and impact of their innovation output, 
through promoting more liberal views and more openness to diversity. We also find 
speculative evidence that social liberalization policies increase entrepreneurial entry through 
promoting more diverse social interactions. We do not find evidence for liberal policies 
attracting top inventors from other regions. 
 
 
Managerial summary: How does the social context impact the rate and direction of 
innovation? This paper examines this question by exploring the impact of two social 
liberalization policies (legalization of same-sex civil unions and medical marijuana) and one 
anti-liberalization policy (passage of abortion restrictions) on innovation in the United States. 
We first show that liberalization policies increase patenting while the anti-liberalization 
policy reduces patenting. Further analyses highlight the impact of these policies on 
individuals’ openness to diversity as a driving mechanism. We show that inventors 
collaborate with more diverse partners after the implementation of liberalization policies, 
producing more innovations and more novel and impactful ones. We discuss the implications 
for firm location decisions, the impact of corporate social responsibility on innovation, and 
sources of regional competitive advantage.  
 
High on Creativity: The Impact of Social Liberalization Policies on Innovation 
Introduction 
Many factors determine the rate and direction of innovation. A vibrant body of research has 
demonstrated that knowledge spillovers (Lucas, 1988; Glaeser, 1999), agglomeration 
economies (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Alcácer and Chung, 2014), search strategies (March, 1991; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), mobility (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Agarwal, Ganco and 
Ziedonis, 2009; Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010), and network position (Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 
2004) are key factors that determine organizational and regional innovation. However, 
relatively less attention has been paid to the social attributes of the context in which innovation 
takes place. The omission is particularly puzzling given the vast literature in organizational 
sociology, psychology, and political science that highlights the importance of the social context 
and policies in shaping the interactions of individuals and their creative output (Gilfillan, 1970; 
Edmondson, 1999; Perry-Smith, 2006; Flores and Barclay, 2016).  
 The relationship between the social context and innovation is theoretically complex and 
involve various mechanisms operating in tandem. Meanwhile, the extant research in innovation 
and strategy has been largely silent on this link. Even in cases where there have been theoretical 
arguments linking innovation and the social context, robust empirical results have been limited 
due to data scarcity and significant empirical challenges. For instance, one prominent line of 
research on social context and innovation is the “Creative Class” theory, which argues that 
social attributes such as tolerance and openness to diversity can attract creative talent to a 
region, leading to higher innovative performance (Jacobs, 1961; Florida, 2002a, 2002b; Page, 
2007; Florida et al., 2008; Wedemeier, 2015). Despite the popularity of the argument among 
scholars and policy makers, there remains little empirical evidence for the causal impact of 
openness on mobility of creative individuals (Glaeser, 2005).  
 Given the theoretical complexity of the impact of social policies and context on 
innovation, we use an inductive empirical approach in this paper. However, unlike most 
inductive papers in management literature that rely on small-N research designs, we use a large-
N design. Our approach is similar to a few recent studies in strategy (e.g., Birhanu et al., 2016; 
Lyngsie and Foss, 2017) and relies on the rich data available on innovation at the state and 
individual levels, combined with an empirical design that allows us to get closer to the causal 
effect of social policies on innovation and the potential mechanisms that drive the main effect.  
 With this goal in mind, we first analyze the impact of two social liberalization policies 
– the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships, and the legalization of 
medical marijuana – and one anti-liberalization policy - the passing of abortion restrictions – 
on the rate and direction of innovation across various states in the United States. The focus on 
these social policies is motivated by a few factors. First, these policies have recently been at 
the center of heated policy debates in the United States and various other countries. While some 
of their economic, social and political outcomes are extensively debated, their impact on 
innovation has largely been missing from discussion. Second, as we discuss below, there is 
some evidence showing that these policies do indeed influence the social context and behavior 
of individuals, hence providing a fertile setting to look more closely into their impact on 
innovation. Third, the staggered implementation of these policies over time enables us to 
address some of the empirical challenges surrounding the estimation of the impact of social 
factors on innovation.  
There are two main empirical challenges associated with assessing the impact of these 
social policies on innovation. Differences in innovative performance after the implementation 
of a social policy may be attributed to other unobservable factors that drive both changes in 
innovation as well as the implementation of the policy. For instance, investment in human 
capital through education or R&D spending may simultaneously increase both the innovation 
in a region and the likelihood of the implementation of social liberal policies in that region. 
One may also be concerned about reverse causality in that the implementation of these policies 
is triggered by changes in creative outcomes. 
To address these challenges, we exploit the staggered timing of each policy across 
different states in the United States to implement a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy to 
estimate the effects of the (anti) liberalization policies by comparing the changes in patenting 
of states that have experienced a policy change in a particular year relative to states that have 
not yet implemented the policy. During our sample period of 1994 to 2006, 6 states and the 
District of Columbia legalized same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships, 11 states 
legalized medical marijuana, and 34 states passed new restrictions on abortion at different 
points in time. Our baseline estimates control for state fixed effects and year fixed effects. We 
also include various longitudinal measures of political orientation, economic conditions, and 
human capital.  
We find that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships 
increases state-level patenting by 6%, and the legalization of medical marijuana increases 
patenting by 7%. In contrast, the passing of an additional abortion restriction reduces patenting 
by about 1%. We find no evidence of any effect before the enactment of the social liberal 
policies. Our main results are also robust to alternative specifications and falsification tests. 
Next, we explore three potential mechanisms that may explain our state-level results. 
Our goal here is not to establish a causal relationship between a specific explanatory variable 
and the outcome of interest. Instead, we follow the reverse causal inference approach, as 
recently advised by Gelman and Imbens (2013), to investigate some of the possible causes of 
the outcome variable of interest to the extent possible. The first mechanism is proposed by the 
Creative Class theory and argues that liberalizations policies attract inventors from other states 
because inventors have a preference to work and live in regions with more tolerance and 
openness to diversity (Jacobs, 1961; Florida, 2002a, 2002b; Florida et al., 2008; Wedemeier, 
2015). The second mechanism draws upon the idea that social liberalization policies can 
influence individuals’ attitude towards openness and diversity, leading them to have more 
diverse social interactions. In turn, more diverse interactions can lead to more diverse 
collaborations among inventors, and consequently result in higher levels of innovative 
performance. The third mechanism builds upon the idea that social liberal policies can lead to 
higher entrance into technology-based entrepreneurship by promoting more diverse social 
interactions and better access to complementary resources needed for entrepreneurial entry.  
We do not find evidence that liberalization policies attract top inventors to a region, as 
predicted by the Creative Class theory. Our estimates suggest that the enactment of all three 
policies, regardless of whether they are socially liberal or anti-liberal, on average leads to a net 
loss of top inventors to other regions. Meanwhile, we show several results that are consistent 
with the idea that social liberalization policies influence individuals’ attitudes towards 
openness and diversity, thus affecting their collaboration patterns and the level and direction 
of their innovative output. We also find speculative evidence suggesting that liberalization 
policies are associated with an increase in technology-based entrepreneurship.  
Our results make several contributions. Discussions going back as early as Schumpeter 
(1934) note that a key determinant of innovation is an organization's or a society's openness to 
new ideas and tolerance towards disruptive behavior, or even “rebellion” against the “status 
quo” (pages 86-94). However, only recently have scholars started to empirically explore the 
role of social context in promoting or hindering innovation (Acemoglu, 2014; Benabou et al., 
2015). Our paper provides one of the first empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
enactment of social policies and innovation. More broadly, our study contributes to the 
literature that has examined factors that determine regional innovation. A long line of research 
has demonstrated the role of skilled labor, knowledge spillovers, infrastructure, and intellectual 
property rights on regional innovation (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Furman, Porter and Stern, 
2002; Galasso and Schankerman, 2010; Alcácer and Chung, 2014; Agrawal et al., 2014, 
Moretti and Wilson, 2014). Our study emphasizes the role of social policies in promoting 
regional innovation. Our findings also contribute to the literature on the antecedents of 
collaboration. While most of prior research has largely assumed the composition of inventive 
teams and the network structure of inventors to be exogenous, we show how the social context 
and policies can influence interactions among individuals in a region and impact the formation 
of new collaborative ties.  
The next section describes the three policies of interest briefly. We then describe the 
data and empirical framework, respectively. We present state-level results of the effect of the 
three policies on innovation. After documenting the effect, we discuss potential mechanisms. 
The final section offers concluding remarks. 
Institutional Background 
Same-Sex civil unions and domestic partnerships  
Policies in favor of same-sex marriage (or civil unions and domestic partnerships) are widely 
associated with liberal mindset and liberal policies (Soule and Earl, 2001; Kane, 2003; Soule, 
2004). In the United States, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights and related 
laws can be determined by each state and local jurisdiction. The federal Defense of Marriage 
Act of 1996 explicitly defines marriage as between a man and a woman. In the landmark United 
States v. Windsor case, the Supreme Court ruled on June 26, 2013 that section 3 of the Defense 
of Marriage Act is unconstitutional and the federal government is required to recognize 
marriages performed in states where same-sex marriage has been legalized. On June 26, 2015, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that state-level bans on same-sex 
marriage are unconstitutional, thereby making same-sex marriage legal in the entire country. 
Because the legalization of same-sex marriages occurred relatively recently after our sample 
period, 1 we take advantage of changes in civil union and domestic partnership laws across 
states. Civil unions and domestic partnerships are a non-religious state-sanctioned form of 
partnership. Like same-sex marriages before 2015, civil unions do not confer federal benefits 
and are not recognized under the federal law. Six states and the District of Columbia changed 
the legal status of civil union and domestic partnerships during our sample period (Table 1).2 
                                                            
1 Vermont was the first state to legalize same sex-sex marriage in September 2009 
2 In many of these states, the legalization of same-sex marriage has since superseded civil union and domestic partnership 
status. 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
Medical marijuana legalization 
Legalization of medical marijuana is broadly linked to liberal policies and liberal agendas in 
the United States and other countries (Haines-Saah et al., 2014; Robinson and Fleishman, 
1984). Under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, cannabis, or marijuana, is classified as a 
Schedule 1 drug in the U.S., having high potential for abuse, no medical use, and not safe to 
use without medical supervision. Starting in the late 1970s, several U.S. based advocacy groups 
attempted to change the drug policy and to decriminalize cannabis. In 2005, over 500 
economists, including libertarian economist Jeffrey Alan Miron and Nobel Laureate Milton 
Friedman, called for legalizing cannabis in an open letter to George W. Bush.3 During our 
sample period, eleven states legalized medical marijuana (Table 2). They have received 
considerable media attention at the local and national level, in part because many occurred 
through voter referendum. The debate remains contentious and ongoing.  
-- Table 2 about here -- 
Abortion restrictions 
Support for legal abortion has long been considered as part of the liberal agenda and policies 
in the U.S. and many other countries (Legge, 1983). While there is no strong consensus among 
U.S. residents on whether women should have the legal right to abortion under any 
circumstance, various polls and surveys suggest that those who identify themselves as liberal 
are significantly more likely to be in favor of abortion rights for women (GALLUP, 2013). 
From a legal point of view, abortion has traditionally been prohibited across many states during 
the early 20th century. The landmark U.S. Supreme Court 1973 decision Roe v. Wade 
invalidated the prior prohibitions and set the legal framework for the availability of abortion. 
The ruling gave women the legal right to have an abortion up to the third trimester. Since then, 
various states have imposed different forms of restriction on abortion through new state 
                                                            
3 http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/endorsers/\#sthash.HgXSb66j.dpuf [accessed March 1, 2016] 
legislatures or amendments to the state constitution. According to the Guttmacher Institute, the 
number of abortion restrictions across various states in the U.S. has increased substantially over 
the past two decades. These restrictions range from extended waiting periods and mandatory 
counseling, to limitations on insurance coverage and near-total abortion bans (Guttmacher 
Institute, 2015).  
We collect the data on the timing of abortion restrictions passed across all the states 
from the Guttmacher Institute and various other public sources. In our analysis we use the 
change in the number of abortion restrictions in each state over time as the proxy for the change 
in the level of legal barrier for abortion in that state. The number of abortion restrictions across 
the states range from 0 to 15 during our sample period, with an average of about 5 restrictions 
and a standard deviation of 3 over the sample period. The average number of restrictions 
changes from about 4 restrictions in 1994 to 6 in 2006. Figure 1 illustrates the number of 
enacted abortion restrictions in each state in 1994 and 2006. 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
Data  
Our data is collected from various sources. Following prior research (Fleming, Mingo, and 
Chen, 2007; Audia and Goncalo, 2007; Vakili, 2016), we use patenting rate as a measure of 
innovation. To construct the patenting rate at the state and individual inventor levels, we used 
the Lai et al. (2013) dataset available on the Patent Network Dataverse. The data covers all the 
patents granted by the USPTO between 1975 and 2010. Due to the long delays between 
application and grant dates, there is considerable right truncation in the number of granted 
patents in the last three years of the sample. Given that the truncation problem is likely to be 
more severe for the states with higher patenting rates, we only used the data for the period 
between 1994 and 2007. We begin our sample in 1994 based on the availability of data for our 
control variables and the first legalization date (1996).  
We collect data on the legalization dates of medical marijuana and same-sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships from various public sources as well as prior research (Wen et al., 2014). 
Data on abortion restrictions is collected from the Guttmacher Institute (2015) and other online 
public sources. We also collect the yearly total public expenditure and education expenditure 
by each state from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data on business R&D per state is retrieved from 
the National Science Foundation's Science and Engineering Indicators dataset. We obtain data 
on the number of individuals with a bachelor degree from Census Education Attainment 
Reports.4 Data on hate crimes is obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform 
Crime Reports.5 We also collected the data on cross-state population mobility from IRS’ SOI 
Tax Stats.6 
Empirical Design 
We exploit the variation in timing of the implementation of each policy across states to estimate 
the effect of the policy on innovation outcomes. Our strategy is similar in spirit to a differences-
in-differences (DD) strategy, where we compare the changes in the outcomes of states that have 
experienced a policy change in a year to other states that have not yet experienced the same 
change.  
To examine the impact of social liberal policies on state-level patenting rate, we 
estimate the following specification (Equation 1):  
(1) 𝑌𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜇𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑠𝑡 is the logged number of patents (plus 1) in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡. The log normalization is 
used to address the skewedness in the distribution of patenting rates across states. In the case 
of the two social liberalization policies, 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is equal to 1 after state 𝑠 implements 
the social liberal policy of interest in year 𝑡. In the case of abortion restrictions, 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 
is equal to the number of abortion restrictions in effect in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡. 𝛽 is the key 
                                                            
4 See https://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/index.html [accessed November 2015] 
5 See https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications\#Hate [accessed November 2015] 
6 See https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-migration-data [accessed February 2017] 
coefficient of interest. In the case of the two social liberalization policies, 𝛽 captures the relative 
change in patenting rate after the policy change in a state. In the case of abortion restrictions, 
𝛽 captures the relative change in patenting rate due to the passage of an additional abortion 
restriction. 𝑋𝑠𝑡 is a vector of time-varying, state-specific economic and political orientation 
controls, including population, total state expenditure, share of education expenditure, business 
R&D expenditure, the size of state population with at least a bachelor degree, real per capita 
personal income, housing price index, income and corporate state tax, the share of democrats 
in the state senate and house, and the party affiliation of the state governor. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 
are state and year fixed effects, respectively. State fixed effects control for all time-invariant 
differences between states, such as geographic characteristics. Year fixed effects control for 
changes over time that affect all states similarly (e.g., national policy changes, and 
macroeconomic growth). We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) and cluster standard errors 
by state to adjust for autocorrelation within states in all specifications (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
In order to explore some of the potential mechanisms, we largely rely on similar 
empirical design and estimation models at the state or individual level with different dependent 
variables. These models are discussed in more detail when we explore each potential 
mechanism.  
State-Level Results 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for our main variables between 1995 and 2007. An 
average state produces 2,088 utility patents per year and has 2,828 inventors, as multiple 
inventors contribute to the same patented invention. About 32% of patents in the sample have 
zero citations and on average, each patent has 7 citations. 
-- Table 3 about here -- 
States on average have an annual spending expenditure of $22.5 billion, of which 
approximately 32% is spent on education at primary, secondary and post-secondary levels. On 
average businesses and other institutions spend about $4.8 billion on research and development 
at the state-level. The average state population is about 5.6 million, out of which 16% has a 
bachelor (or higher) degree. The real per capita personal income – deflated with the national 
CPI (1982-1984 dollars) – is about $17,000. Average housing price index is 2.6. The average 
income tax is approximately 3% and the average corporate tax is just above 15% at the state-
level. About 40% of the state governors are democrats, and democrats and republicans have 
roughly similar shares in the state senate and house over our sample period. There is 
considerable variance across states in these figures. 
Table 4 reports our main results on the impact of the three policies on the log-
normalized patenting rate at the state-level. All three policies have a significant effect on state-
level patenting and the magnitudes are economically meaningful. Both the legalization of 
same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships and the legalization of medical marijuana 
increase patenting at the state-level by 6% and 7%, respectively. In contrast, the passage of an 
additional abortion restriction reduces patenting by about 1% during the sample period. One 
percent increase (decrease) in patenting is roughly equivalent to 21 more (fewer) patents per 
year at the state level. Most controls are insignificant due to their small within-state variance 
over time.7 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
So far, our analysis has assumed that the timing of these policies is uncorrelated with 
factors that determine the outcomes of interest, conditional on the baseline controls. However, 
our estimates may suffer from reverse causality. In other words, it may be the case that states 
with higher patenting rate were more likely to implement social liberal policies and that what 
we are capturing is simply a continuation of trends started before these policy changes. To test 
this possibility, we conduct several analyses.  
First, we examine the state-level patenting rates before and after policy changes. In the 
case of reverse causality, we should be able to observe pre-trends in state-level patenting in 
                                                            
7 Subsequent analyses include the full set of controls but we suppress them in the tables. The tables with full set of controls 
are available upon request. 
years leading to policy changes. To investigate the presence of pre-trends, we plot the yearly 
treatment estimates associated with the legalization of medical marijuana and the legalization 
of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships at the state level (Figures 2 and 3, 
respectively). Each point on these graphs is the estimated difference in log-normalized 
patenting between treated and control states in the years before and after the policy change. 
Both graphs show an increase in patenting at the state-level starting approximately 3 years after 
the policy change. There is little evidence of upward trends before the implementation of the 
two social liberal policies.8 
-- Figures 2 and 3 about here -- 
We also run a series of falsification tests in the spirit of those performed by Bertrand et 
al. (2004), whereby we assign a hundred random placebo legalization dates for each state in 
the sample. Since the placebo legalization dates are selected randomly, we should see a 
significant effect (i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis that legalization had no effect) at the 5 
percent level roughly 5 percent of the time. We obtained significant estimates for the placebo 
treatments only 4 percent of time, which suggest that our main findings are not driven by 
spurious trends in the data and are indeed linked to the observed policy changes. We also 
implemented a hazard rate analysis, where we examine whether past patenting rate could 
predict the timing of the implementation of these policies. The results show no significant 
relationship between past patenting rate and the timing of legalization events in our sample 
(available in Table A1 in the online appendix).  
Another concern is that the estimates may be driven by other concurrent policy changes 
that may increase innovation. To address this potential issue, we checked various public records 
to see if we can identify simultaneous policy changes in the states that have implemented each 
of these legalizations. We do not find consistent evidence of simultaneous policy changes at 
the state level. Moreover, our set of controls should at least partially capture the effect of 
                                                            
8 We cannot produce the yearly treatment graph for abortion restrictions because there are many instances of abortion 
restrictions in a state over time and thus there are no obvious pre- and post- periods. 
unobserved policy changes that impact patenting through increased public spending, R&D 
expenditure, education, average income and living costs, and political affiliation. In short, 
while we cannot wholly rule out its possibility, we do not find evidence that suggests our 
estimates are fully driven by other concurrent policy changes. 
Exploring Potential Mechanisms 
Having established a robust relationship between social liberal policies and state-level 
patenting, we now turn to three potential mechanisms that can explain the positive effect of 
social liberalization policies on innovation.  
Mechanism 1: Social liberal policies and mobility 
Florida (2014) defines creative class as individuals who are active in creative occupations such 
as research, engineering, art, entertainment, acting, design, entrepreneurship and management.9 
In a series of works, Florida and colleagues show that individuals belonging to the creative 
class have on average higher wages and salaries (Florida 2014), disproportionally contribute to 
economic development of regions (Lee, Florida and Acs, 2004), and are the main producers of 
creative output (Florida et al., 2008; Florida, 2014). The Creative Class theory argues that 
creative individuals on average have a taste for certain values, like meritocracy, diversity, and 
openness. Hence, the theory suggests that for companies, cities, states, and countries to attract 
creative talent and have higher levels of creative output, they need to devise social liberal 
policies that promote diversity and openness to different life styles and ideas.10 If inventors 
have a taste for more liberal policies, as suggested by the Creative Class theory, we should 
expect an increase in their movement to states that implement these policies. In contrast, we 
should see an increase in the number of inventors leaving a state if the state passes additional 
                                                            
9 While all innovators fall into the creative class, the category itself is broader than only innovators. 
10 While the creative class argument has had considerable impact both outside and inside academia, it has also received 
criticism due to the vagueness of its measures (e.g., “Creative Class”, “Bohemian Index”) and endogeneity concerns 
surrounding the relationship between Florida’s measures of tolerance and creative outcomes. For example, in his review of 
Florida's “The Rise of the Creative Class”, Glaeser (2005) uses Florida and Knudson (2005)’s data to show that the estimated 
effect of bohemians in a metropolitan area on growth is economically and statistically insignificant after controlling for the 
fraction of educated adults. 
abortion restrictions.  
To examine the impact of social liberal policies on the mobility of inventors, we 
estimate the following specification (Equation 2):  
(2) 𝑌𝑠1𝑠2𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠1𝑠2𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠1𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠2𝑡 + 𝛿𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠1𝑠2 + 𝜇𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑠1𝑠2𝑡 captures the number of inventors that moved from state 𝑠2 to state 𝑠1 in year 𝑡. 
We capture mobility based on changes in the location of inventors recorded on patents filed in 
different years. Since a median inventor has only one patent in our sample, the sample of mobile 
inventors is highly skewed towards top 15% inventors in the sample. Hence, we only test the 
mobility argument for the sample of top inventors with this analysis. Below, we attempt to 
address this limitation by using complementary data sources. In the case of the two social 
liberalization policies, 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠1𝑠2𝑡 captures the difference in the legalization status of 
state 𝑠1 and state 𝑠2 in year 𝑡. The value switches to 1 if state 𝑠1 implements the policy in year 
𝑡 while it is not yet implemented in state 𝑠2, and switches to -1 in the reverse scenario. It is 
equal to 0 if both states have a similar policy status. In the case of abortion restrictions, 
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠1𝑠2𝑡 is equal to the difference in the number of abortion restrictions in effect 
between state 𝑠1 and state 𝑠2 in year 𝑡. 𝛽 is the key coefficient of interest and captures the effect 
of a change in policy status between 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 on the mobility of top inventors from state 𝑠2 to 
𝑠1. We also include the full set of controls for each state (and hence their differences). All 
estimations include state-pair dummies, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠1𝑠2, that would control for the time-invariant 
differences between each pair of states (such as their geographical distance) that could affect 
mobility between them. 
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 5 present the results for the effect of each policy on the mobility 
of top inventors across states. A negative net flow to a state means that the state has on average 
lost a net portion of its top inventors to other states due to policy implementation. In contrast, 
a positive flow means that the state has attracted other states’ top inventors after the policy 
implementation. The estimates suggest that the effect of liberalization policies on inter-state 
net mobility of top inventors is inconsistent with the mobility arguments of the Creative Class 
theory. The direction of effects for the two liberalization policies is the opposite of what the 
Creative Class theory predicts with wide confidence intervals. The direction of the effect for 
the anti-liberalization policy is in line with the Creative Class prediction, but the size is small 
and close to zero. To corroborate our findings, we also restructured the data at the state-year-
level and estimated the aggregated net flow into and out of each state in each year using an 
estimation model based on equation 1 (Table A2). Again, we do not find results consistent with 
the Creative Class mobility argument. 
-- Table 5 about here -- 
The main concern with these estimations is that the sample only includes the top 15% 
inventors, hence potentially excludes the mobility of to-be inventors. To address this issue, we 
performed the analysis based on two other measures of mobility. We first used the cross-state 
mobility data based on tax records provided by the IRS’ SOI Tax Stats. The data is constructed 
based on individual tax records for the entire population of the United States and covers our 
sample period. The downside of using this data is that it includes the whole population and not 
just the creative class. On the positive side however, the data is much more reliable and does 
not suffer from the usual false positives and false negatives of measures based on patent data 
(Ge et al., 2016). Using the estimation model in equation 2 (based on a state-pair structure), we 
re-estimated the mobility of population as the result of the three policies. The results are 
reported in columns 4 to 6 in Table 5. Again, the estimates are not consistent with the creative 
class mobility hypothesis. The direction of the effects for the legalization of same-sex civil 
unions and domestic partnerships and for the passage of additional abortion restrictions are the 
opposite of what the Creative Class theory would predict.  
We also constructed a third measure of mobility based on two sets of education data: 
1) the total number of individuals with a post-secondary degree in state 𝑠 in year 𝑡, and 2) the 
number of individuals who received a post-secondary degree from state 𝑠 in year 𝑡. Using these 
two sets of data, we calculated the net number of individuals with a post-secondary degree that 
moved to (or left) state 𝑠 in year 𝑡. While this dataset does not capture the whole creative class 
population, it captures the part of population that is likely to be at risk of patenting, assuming 
most inventors have post-secondary education (Table A3). Again, in the cases of both 
liberalization policies, the direction of effects is opposite of the creative class prediction. None 
of the effects are significant at the 10 percent level.11  
Taken together, we do not find support for the creative class argument that the 
implementation of social liberal policies would attract top talent from other regions. One should 
note that the lack of support for the Creative Class argument in our setting does not invalidate 
the theory. Inventors are only a subsample of the creative class population and they may 
perceive and react to these policy changes differently from other creative workers. Research 
based on more accurate data on the mobility of to-be inventors and the heterogeneous effects 
of these policies may also shed more light on inventors’ mobility. 
Mechanism 2: Social liberal policies and interactions among diverse individuals 
The second potential mechanism that can explain the effect of social liberal policies on 
innovative outcomes is based on the argument that the enactment of social liberal policies can 
lead to more social liberal public opinion on average, hence leading to more diverse social 
interactions and collaborations. Moreover, social liberal policies can legitimize an issue and 
hence decrease its significance as a fault line and a barrier for collaboration. Consequently, 
more diverse collaborations can lead to higher levels of innovative output and more novel 
innovations.  
 Over the past few years, public policy scholars have provided substantial empirical 
evidence that social liberal policies influence social liberal public opinion. For instance, 
Kreitzer et al (2014) show that the Supreme Court ruling in Varnum v. Brien, which established 
same-sex marriage, had a causal and significant effect on public opinion of minority rights. 
They argue that the signalling of the court decision shifted individuals’ opinions toward being 
                                                            
11 We performed an additional hazard analysis at the individual level to test the robustness of our estimates. The results, 
presented in table A4 in the online appendix, show no effect of legalization on the hazard of moving at the individual level. 
more consistent with the new state law, particularly for individuals who were on the margin. 
Hanley et al (2012) find that the Roe v. Wade decision shifted the public support towards more 
support for abortion among those who were aware of the decision. Flores and Barclay (2016) 
show that residents of states that legalized same-sex marriage subsequently significantly 
reduced their anti-gay attitudes. Other research in sociology and political science shows that 
social liberal policies are associated with higher levels of social diversity, increase general trust, 
and promote interactions between individuals with more heterogeneous views, life styles, and 
racial-ethnic backgrounds (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Levi, 1998; Tendler and Freedheim, 
1994; Heller, 1996; Szalacha, 2003). Hence, social liberalization policies can impact the public 
opinion of a region towards openness and diversity.  
Individuals’ public opinions, in turn, affect their social interactions and behaviors. For 
example, studies in sociology and psychology have shown that liberal individuals are more 
likely to be in favor of social change and equality, while non-liberals usually place more 
emphasis on tradition and stability (Tetlock, 2000; Jost et al., 2003; Schwartz,1996). 
Particularly relevant to our argument, liberal views are shown to be strongly associated with 
more diverse social interaction. Anderson et al., (2014) find that individuals with stronger 
liberal views express lower levels of same-race preference (i.e., racial homophily) for their 
dating partners and are more likely to date individuals from a different race than those with 
more conservative views. Work in applied psychology suggest that individuals’ attitudes 
toward diversity shape their social interactions (Perrine, 2005).12  
Social interactions are precursors to collaborations. To the extent that individual’s 
collaboration networks are to some extent shaped by their social interactions, an increase in the 
diversity of one’s social interactions should arguably lead to an increase in the diversity of their 
collaborators as well.  Prior research in strategy and innovation has highlighted the importance 
of diversity in knowledge, background and perspectives in the innovation process (Hong and 
                                                            
12 Perrine (2005) find that freshmen students who were more open to diversity during orientation week tended to develop more 
interpersonal interactions with other students and faculty and improved their learning outcomes. 
Page, 2004; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010). Diverse teams tend to have higher performance than 
homogenous teams because individuals on diverse teams are more likely to evaluate problems 
differently and have less redundant knowledge (Hong and Page, 2004; Burt, 2004). Given that 
knowledge recombination is central to the innovation process (Simonton, 1999; Fleming, 2001; 
Kaplan and Vakili, 2015), more diverse collaborations that combine distinct knowledge and 
ideas are more likely to produce more breakthrough innovation.  
 In summary, this mechanism can be broken down into the following arguments: social 
liberal policies can influence the views of individuals towards openness and diversity; 
consequently, these policies can increase the diversity of individuals’ social interactions and 
collaborations; this in turn, can boost individuals’ innovation output and result in more novel 
knowledge recombinations and more breakthrough innovations.  
Several recent studies in political science have provided evidence for the first part of 
the argument – i.e., social liberal policies lead to more social liberal public opinion. We 
corroborate these findings using a measure of public opinion, developed by Enns and Koch 
(2013).13 In particular, we can show that the effect of these policies on state-level patenting 
rate is at least partially mediated through changing the liberal views of individuals (Figure A1).  
There is relatively less evidence on the impact of these policies on openness and 
diversity of social interaction. We provide indirect evidence for this link by examining the 
impact of the three policies on two proxies for openness and social interaction diversity at the 
state level and two measures of collaboration diversity at the individual level. The first state-
level measure is based on the “city citation” variable developed in Gambardella and Girratana 
(2010), and is equal to the ratio of the citations by each patent to prior patents with at least one 
inventor in the same city as focal patent’s inventors over the total number of citations by that 
patent to previous patents. At the state level, we construct the measure as the average share of 
local citations for all patents filed in each state in any given year. An increase in social 
                                                            
13 Enns and Koch (2013) use demographic and geographic information from more than 740,000 respondents to generate a 
dynamic state-measure of partisanship, ideology, and the public’s policy mood from 1956 to 2010. We use a mean centered 
and standardized version of their measure. 
interactions and diversity of interactions in a location should arguably lead to an increase in 
local knowledge diffusion, which would manifest in an increase in the share of local patent 
citations (Gambardella and Girratana, 2010). Columns 1 to 3 in Table 6 present the estimated 
effects of each policy on the share of local citations at the state-level. The results confirm this 
argument. Approximately 5.8% of the citations in each state are local (i.e. are to prior patents 
with at least one inventor in the same city as the focal patents’ inventors). The estimates suggest 
that the liberalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships, and the liberalization 
of medical marijuana increase the share of local citations by 15% and 11% respectively. The 
increase is equivalent to approximately 1 percentage point increase in the share of local citation. 
The estimated effect of the passage of additional abortion restrictions is not significant but is 
in the predicted direction.14  
-- Table 6 about here -- 
The second measure is based on the pace of knowledge circulation in each region. If 
social liberal policies do indeed lead to more openness and social interactions among inventors 
in a region, we should expect an increase in the pace of knowledge diffusion. We use the time 
gap (measured in number of days) between the application date of each patent and the 
application dates of patents cited as prior art as a proxy for the pace of knowledge diffusion. 
We then construct the measure at the state level in any given year by calculating the mean time 
gap for each patent and its prior arts filed in that state-year. We expect the time gap to shrink 
if the pace of knowledge circulation in a region increases. The average time gap between 
patents and prior arts at the state-year level is approximately 3329 days (or 9.1 years) during 
our sample period. The results in columns 4 to 6 of Table 6 suggest that the legalization of 
same-sex civil unions and the legalization of medical marijuana decreases the time gap by 10% 
and 3% (equivalent to 340 days and 112 days), respectively. The estimated effect for the 
                                                            
14 The measure is somewhat noisy due to the use of city names to construct the measure. For example, while in practice a 
citation from an inventor in San Francisco to another inventor in Berkeley is arguably a local citation, due to our reliance on 
city names, such a citation would be considered non-local. We do not expect the noisiness in data to be systematically biasing 
our estimates, but they can increase the standard errors of the estimated coefficients.  
additional abortion restrictions is not significant at the 10 % level, but the direction of the effect 
is in line with the prediction.  
In addition, we exploit the variation in acceptance of the subject matter of the two 
liberalization policies at the time of their implementations in treated states to explore the role 
of public opinion in shaping the effect of these policies on innovation output. The core idea is 
that in states where public opinion is already largely aligned with these policies, their 
implementation will not cause a large change in public opinion and hence should not have a 
large effect on innovation output. In contrast, we should expect larger effects in states where 
the subject matter of these policies is more contested and hence there is arguably more room 
for the legalization events to influence the public opinion. The results (Table A5) confirm our 
predictions. The preceding analyses suggest that social liberalization policies can impact the 
state-level innovation outcomes by influencing public opinion, and their effects are larger in 
states where the public opinion is less aligned with the policies. 
Next, we present individual-level evidence on the effect of these policies on the 
collaboration diversity of inventors and their innovation output. To isolate the effect of each 
policy on individual inventors, we only include incumbent inventors in the sample, i.e., 
inventors who had at least one patent prior to a policy change in their state of residence. We 
also exclude mobile inventors to control for the mobility dynamics to the extent possible. In 
the case of abortion restrictions, since some states have passed additional abortion restrictions 
at different points of time, we only include inventors that have at least one patent before the 
first event in our sample and never change their state throughout the sample period. We thus 
expect the estimates associated with additional abortion restrictions to be noisier and more 
attenuated due to more restrictive sampling and the longer time needed to observe the effects. 
To estimate the impact of the policies on inventor level outcomes, we use the following 
equation: 
(3) 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜇𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the outcome of interest for inventor 𝑖 (residing in state 𝑠) in year 𝑡. 
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 is equal to 1 if inventor 𝑖 is located in state 𝑠 that has implemented the policy 
of interest in year 𝑡, and 0 otherwise. Again, in the case of abortion restrictions, 
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the number of abortion restrictions in effect for inventor i located in state 𝑠 
in year 𝑡. 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 includes time-varying state-level controls from the above specification as well 
as inventor experience measured by the number of patents granted to inventor 𝑖 in a five-year 
window. In addition, we control for inventor and year fixed effects (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡, 
respectively). 
First, we test the effect of each policy on the patenting rate of incumbent inventors. 
Table 7 reports the results for the impact of each policy on the logged-normalized patenting of 
non-mobile incumbent inventors. The estimated coefficients suggest that the legalization of 
same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships increase individual patenting by 
approximately 2.9%. Similarly, legalization of medical marijuana increases incumbent 
inventors' patenting by over 4.6%. In contrast, the passage of an additional abortion restriction 
reduces individual patenting by approximately 0.1%.  
-- Table 7 about here -- 
Next, we test the impact of the three policies on collaboration diversity of inventors. 
We use two different measures of diversity in collaboration. The first measure is based on the 
number of new collaborative ties formed by each inventor. A pair-wise collaboration between 
inventor 𝑖 and another inventor is considered new if no such collaboration has occurred 
between 1976 (the first year in both Lai et al. and NBER patent datasets) and year 𝑡 − 1. We 
only use unique observations of pair-wise collaborations. In other words, if inventor 𝑖 
collaborates with the same person on two different patents in the same year, we count only one 
unique collaboration.  
The second measure captures the diversity in the knowledge base of inventors involved 
in each patent at the individual level. To construct the measure, we first extracted the set of 
technological classes in which each inventor and her co-inventors have patented prior to focal 
patent on which they are collaborating. For each inventor and her co-inventors, we then 
calculated the breadth of inventive experience of the team as measured by the count of unique 
technological classes in which they have patented before. We then take the mean of this 
measure across all patents of each inventor in any given year to construct the new variable. An 
increase in the co-inventors’ knowledge breadth signals an increase in the diversity of 
knowledge that the focal inventor gains access to through collaboration. In all estimations, we 
further control for the total number of pair-wise collaborations for inventor 𝑖 in year 𝑡 to capture 
the effect of each policy on collaboration diversity above and beyond its effect on the total 
number of collaborations.  
Models 1 to 3 in Table 8 report the estimated effect of each policy on the number of 
new collaborative ties formed by incumbent inventors. The estimates suggest that the 
legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships lead to a 22% increase15 in the 
incumbent inventor’s new pair-wise collaborative ties. The change in the number of new 
collaborative ties is above and beyond the change in the total number of collaborative ties.  
Similarly, the legalization of medical marijuana leads to an increase of approximately 17% in 
incumbent inventor’s new collaborative ties. The estimate for the passage of abortion 
restrictions is not significant at the 10% level. Models 4 to 6 present the estimated effects of 
each policy on the average knowledge breadth of co-inventors. Incumbent inventors on average 
have worked in inventive teams with a prior experience of patenting across more than 3 
technological classes. The results suggest that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and the 
legalization of medical marijuana increase technological breadth of inventive teams involving 
incumbent inventors by approximately 1% and 5%, respectively.16 The estimated effect for the 
passage of additional abortion restrictions is not significant at the 10% level, though the sign 
                                                            
15 The percentage increases are calculated based on the mean number of new collaborative ties for the inventors 
included in each regression. The mean values used for each regression are slightly different from those reported 
in Table 3 since the set of incumbent inventors changes depending on the implementation date of each policy. 
16 The percentage increases are calculated based on the mean technological breadth of inventive teams for the 
inventors included in each regression.   
is consistent with the prediction.  
-- Table 8 about here – 
So far, we have shown evidence that social liberalization policies are associated with 
change in public opinions and the diversity of social interactions and collaborations. The third 
part of the argument behind this mechanism suggests that an increase in the diversity of 
collaborations positively affects the novelty and impact of innovation outcomes. Here, we first 
show the effect of the three policies on the share of novel recombinations and the number of 
breakthroughs by incumbent inventors. Subsequently, we provide some evidence that the effect 
is potentially mediated through the change in the collaboration diversity of inventors.  
The U.S. Patent Office organizes technological domains into approximately 100,000 
technological subclasses and assigns one or more subclasses to each patent. Following 
Fleming, Mingo and Chen (2007), we define a novel technological recombination as an 
instance where a new subclass pair is assigned for the first time to a patent. For each patent, we 
then define the share of novel recombinations as the ratio of novel subclass pairs to total 
subclass pairs assigned to the patent. We subsequently construct inventor 𝑖's share of novel 
recombinations in year 𝑡 by taking the mean of the share of novel recombinations in i’s patents 
in year 𝑡. To calculate the share of breakthrough inventions, following prior research, we use 
the share of inventor 𝑖’s patents that belong to the top 10% highly cited patents in year 𝑡. Table 
9 reports the results. The results in Model 1 suggest a 0.2 percentage point increase in the 
incumbent inventors’ share of novel recombinations after the legalization of same-sex civil 
unions and domestic partnerships. Given that approximately 2 percent of all class 
recombinations are novel in the sample, a 0.1 percentage point increase is equivalent to an 
average 5 percent increase in the share of novel recombinations. Similarly, the estimates in 
Model 2 suggest a 0.3 percentage point increase in the incumbent inventor’s share of novel 
recombinations after the legalization of medicinal marijuana. The estimated effect is not 
significant at the 10% level for the passage of additional abortion restrictions. Models 4 to 6 in 
Table 9 report the effect of each policy on the share of breakthrough innovations. The results 
in Model 4 suggest that the effect of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships on the 
share of breakthrough innovations is positive, but not significant at the 10% level. The 
estimates in Model 5 show a 0.4 percentage point increase in incumbent inventor’s share of 
breakthrough innovations after the legalization of medical marijuana. Results in Model 6 
suggest that an additional abortion restriction reduces incumbent inventor’s share of 
breakthrough innovations by 0.1 percentage points.  
-- Table 9 about here -- 
Finally, we test whether the policy effects on innovation rate, novel recombinations and 
breakthrough innovations are mediated through the change in collaboration patterns.  Figures 
A2 and A3 in the online appendix present the results for the mediation analyses in the cases of 
the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships and the legalization of 
medical marijuana. They suggest that more than 70% of the effect of these policies on rate, 
novelty and impact of innovation outcomes is driven by the increase in the diversity of 
incumbents’ collaborations (as measured by the share of new collaborative ties and inventive 
team’s knowledge diversity). While these results do not provide causal evidence on the 
relationship between the policies and outcomes, they provide a more fine-grained depiction of 
the chain of effects at the individual level and are consistent with the idea that social liberal 
policies are associated with more diverse collaborations, which in turn can lead to more novel 
and impactful innovations. 
Mechanism 3: Social liberal policies and entrepreneurship  
By promoting more diverse social interactions, social liberal policies can also facilitate higher 
rates of entrance into entrepreneurship. Access to more diverse connections can enable 
individuals to receive more timely information on entrepreneurial opportunities, an important 
driving factor of entrepreneurial entry (Burt, 1987, 2004). Moreover, individuals with more 
diverse interaction are more likely to find and mobilize the complementary resources, including 
financial human, and physical capital, needed to start an entrepreneurial venture (Burt, 2000). 
To the extent that a social liberal policy lowers discriminatory behavior, it can also facilitate 
access to the labor market and more mainstream channels for raising capital, further supporting 
entrepreneurial activities. Higher rates of entrepreneurship, particularly in high-tech segments, 
can further lead to higher levels of innovation undertaken by new ventures.  
 One should note that the impact of social policies on incumbent inventors is not fully 
separate from their impact on entrepreneurial entry. Both rely on an increase in diverse social 
interactions at the individual level. Moreover, entrepreneurial entry may be partly driven by 
incumbent inventors pursuing opportunities opened up by their inventions. However, the two 
have some theoretical distinctions. The former effect largely relies on knowledge 
recombination advantages created by more diverse networks. The latter relies more on access 
to complementary resources and better access to labor and capital markets. 
Empirically testing the impact of social liberal policies on entrepreneurship and its 
underlying mechanisms require rich data on new ventures, the characteristics of entrepreneurs, 
and their network structure. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to observe this 
information. Nevertheless, we can provide some indirect evidence for the impact of the social 
policies on entrepreneurship in our setting. Specifically, we use the number of new firms 
patenting in a state as a proxy for entrepreneurship. We use the assignee information on a patent 
to identify the organization to which the patent is assigned. Location of inventors on each patent 
is used to determine the state location of each organization.17  
Table 10 presents the estimated impact of each policy in our setting on the number of 
patenting organizations at the state level using the estimation model in equation 1. The results 
show that the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships and the 
legalization of medical marijuana increase the number of patenting organizations in each state 
by 9% and 12%, respectively. In contrast, the passage of an additional abortion restriction 
decreases the number of patenting organizations in a state by approximately 1%. All three 
                                                            
17 Note that many companies register their headquarters in states other than where they actually operate for legal and tax 
purposes. To address this issue, we use the state location of inventors to assign organizations to states. An organization may 
be assigned to multiple states if its inventors reside in multiple states.   
estimates are significant at the 1% level. Our mediation analysis (Figure A4) further suggests 
that the change in individuals’ liberal views partially mediates the effect of each policy on new 
patenting organizations. In Table 11 we explore the effect of these policies by organization 
size. The results suggest that social liberal policies disproportionately increase the effect on the 
patenting rate of smaller organizations (where size is proxied by the size of patent stock at the 
time of policy implementation), while they disproportionately decrease the effect on larger 
organizations.18 Taken together with the extensive margin effect from Table 11, these results 
suggest that social liberal policies may have facilitated entrepreneurship entry and 
disproportionately benefited smaller firms.  
-- Tables 10 and 11 about here -- 
Our measure of entrepreneurial entrance has some limitations. Most importantly, if an 
established organization starts patenting for the first time, it will be identified as a new venture 
in our data. Unfortunately, we cannot separate new ventures from large organizations that 
patent for the first time after a policy change using patent data. Hence, the readers should 
interpret this result with caution. We hope that future research can investigate the link between 
social policies and entrepreneurship more extensively.   
Other mechanisms  
There are potentially other mechanisms that we have not tested. For example, the social liberal 
policies may influence the incentive structure for innovation within firms and their hiring and 
promotion policies by affecting the views of their CEOs and top management. Past research 
shows that firms whose managers have more liberal views are more likely to have gender parity 
in hiring and promotion rates (Carnahan and Greenwood, 2017). These policies may also 
directly influence the motivations of creative individuals. Legally mandated social policies, 
similar to those in our setting, can also affect discriminatory behavior which can have important 
labor productivity outcomes. Our aim in this paper is not to unravel all the possible mechanisms 
                                                            
18 In the case of abortion restrictions, we cannot construct the “size of patent stock” since there are several states with multiple 
restrictions implemented at different points of time. 
behind the estimated first-order effect of social policies on innovation. Rather, our goal is to 
establish the significant role of social policies in shaping innovation outcomes across regions 
and to take a first step towards exploring some of the possible underlying mechanisms. 
Discussion 
Innovation is shaped by the social interactions of individuals. Yet, little is known about how 
social policies and context influence innovation. Our paper documents the first-order impact 
of social policies and context on innovation. To address the endogeneity issues, we exploit the 
staggered timing of two social liberal policies - the legalization of same-sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships and the legalization of medical marijuana - and one anti-liberalization 
policy - the passage of abortion restrictions - across different states of the United States. The 
results show that the two social liberalization policies have a significant, positive, and 
economically meaningful effect on state-level innovation output, while passage of additional 
abortion restrictions has the opposite effect.  
We also test three possible mechanisms through which social (anti) liberal policies can 
influence innovative outcomes in a region: attracting talent from other regions, increasing 
incumbent inventors’ innovation output through promoting more diverse social interactions, 
and increasing entrance into entrepreneurship. We do not find support for the claim that regions 
with more liberal environments attract creative talent from other regions. However, we find 
support for the argument suggesting that social liberal policies can promote more diverse social 
interactions, potentially through promoting more openness towards diversity. Speculatively, 
we also find evidence for the positive impact of social liberal policies on entrepreneurship. 
Our analyses are not without its limitations. While we have attempted to provide 
evidence of micro-mechanisms at the individual and state level that drive the main results, there 
are many steps between the implementation of the policies and innovation outcomes. Thus, 
there is still the concern that changes in individual outcomes are attributed to other concurrent 
policies at the regional level. Moreover, we lack fine-grained data on the mobility of to-be 
inventors, which precludes us from teasing out the channel through which social liberal 
environments impact the mobility of inventors. Our mobility estimates also ignore the possible 
heterogeneity in inventors’ mobility decisions in response to these policies. For instance, 
experienced inventors may have lower location switching costs or they may face increasing 
competition from the entrance of new inventors. For these reasons, we are limited in our ability 
to provide strong causal evidence on the underlying drivers of the impact of social liberal 
policies on innovation. Nevertheless, we provide one of the first empirical evidence for the 
impact of social liberal policies on innovation outcomes at the state and individual levels. 
Our findings have several individual, firm, and policy implications. From a theoretical 
point of view, we provide additional insight into the antecedents of collaborative ties within 
the innovation context (Teodoridis et al., 2017). Prior research has largely assumed teams and 
inventive ties as given and focused on the consequences of team composition on innovation 
outcomes. We show how the social context within which innovation takes place can shape the 
inventive collaborations among individuals and thus influence their innovation outcomes.  
Prior literature on location decisions largely emphasizes the role of knowledge, human 
capital and other agglomeration factors in shaping the location decision of firms (Shaver and 
Flyer, 2000; Alcácer and Chung, 2007). Our results suggest that the effect of social liberal 
policies at the regional level operate, at least partially, at the individual level and through the 
interactions of individuals in that region. This highlights the importance of considering the 
social environment of a region when making location decisions.   
At the firm level, our findings also inform the literature on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Recent studies have provided some evidence for the positive effect of 
CSR practices on the financial performance of companies (Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2014; Flammer 2015). Past research shows how CSR can increase employees’ morale 
(Soloman and Hansen, 1985) and appeal to employees’ preference for non-pecuniary benefits 
by adding purpose and meaningfulness to their work (Burbano, 2016). Our findings add a new 
potential mechanism through which CSR can positively influence firms’ financial 
performance. In particular, our findings suggest that the CSR practices that particularly 
promote diversity and inclusive employment at the workplace (such as pro-LGBT policies) can 
influence the competitive advantage of firms by increasing the innovative productivity of 
existing employees by promoting more diverse teams and connections in the organization.  
At the national and regional level, enacting more social liberal policies can potentially 
lead to superior creative and innovative performance and create regional competitive 
advantage. Some states are in the process of reviewing the impact of civil right laws on the 
economic productivity of the region.19 Our results can provide more insights into the 
implications of these decisions. 
Finally, our work calls for further research into the relatively unexplored relationship 
between innovation and social context. For instance, what are the contingencies under which 
social liberal policies may positively (or negatively) influence innovation outcomes? How does 
the interaction between social policies and economic policies affect the innovation process? 
What is the effect of social liberal policies on other issues related to creativity and innovation 
such as job creation and labor productivity? Shedding light on these questions will undoubtedly 
inform our understanding of the determinants of individual, organizational, and regional 
innovation. 
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Figure 1- The Number of Abortion Restrictions Enacted Across States in 1994 and in 2006 
 
Figure 2- Yearly Treatment Effect of Legalization of Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships on State-
Level Logged Patenting  
 
Notes: Figure plots estimated year by year pre- and post-legalization changes in patenting from OLS regressions 
with state and year fixed effects and controls. Each point represents the estimated difference between the treated 
(legalized) and control (non-legalized) state in each year, along with upper and lower bounds for 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Figure 3- Yearly Treatment Effect of Legalization of Medical Marijuana on State-Level Logged Patenting  
 
Notes: Figure plots estimated year by year pre- and post-legalization changes in patenting from OLS regressions 
with state and year fixed effects and controls. Each point represents the estimated difference between the treated 
(legalized) and control (non-legalized) state in each year, along with upper and lower bounds for 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Table 1- Effective Time of Civil Union and Domestic Partnership Status 
State Effective Year 
Hawaii 1998 
Vermont 2000 
District of Columbia  2002 
Maine 2004 
Massachusetts 2004 
California 2005 
Connecticut 2005 
Note: This table lists the dates that changed the 
status of civil unions and domestic partnerships 
across states in the United States between 1995 
and 2006. Civil unions and domestic partnerships 
in the United States are determined by each state 
or local jurisdiction. 
 
Table 2- Effective Time of State Medical Marijuana Laws 
State Effective Year 
California 1996 
Oregon 1998 
Washington 1998 
Alaska 1999 
Maine  1999 
Hawaii 2000 
Colorado 2001 
Nevada 2001 
Montana 2004 
Vermont 2004 
Rhode Island  2006 
Note: This table lists the dates of medical 
marijuana legalization across states in the United 
States between 1995 and 2006.  
 
  
Table 3- Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Level of 
Observation 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variables:       
Number of new 
collaborative ties 
Individual-
Year 
15,451,368 0.217 1.094 0 77 
Collaborative team’s 
knowledge diversity 
Individual-
Year 
15,451,368 3.234 4.468 0 134 
Patent count 
Individual-
Year 
15,451,368 0.143 0.631 0 98 
Share of novel 
recombinations 
Individual-
Year 
15,451,368 0.021 0.109 0 1 
Share of patents in the 
top 10% highly cited 
patents 
Individual-
Year 
15,451,368 0.013 0.108 0 1 
Net mobility of top 
inventors to state 
State-Year 599 0.055 32.617 -219 183 
Liberal views of 
individuals 
State-Year 599 0.000 0.136 -0.235 0.765 
Patent count State-Year 599 2,088.115 3,398.681 28 28,011 
Inventor count State-Year 599 2,828.574 4,594.529 37 35,387 
Patenting 
organizations count 
State-Year 599 495.688 643.120 11 4861 
Share of local 
citations 
State-Year 599 0.058 0.027 0.007 0.190 
Time gap between 
patents and prior art 
State-Year 599 3329.326 536.6829 881.8828 5275.205 
Controls:       
Total number of 
collaborative ties 
Individual-
Year 
15,451,368 0.311 1.437 0 83 
5-year experience 
Individual-
Year 
15,451,368 1.479 3.896 0 649 
Business R&D State-Year 599 4,761.258 7,998.678 55 71,334.99 
State expenditure State-Year 599 22,500,000 2,8100,000 1,825,640 225,000,000 
Share of education 
expenditure 
State-Year 599 31.784 5.587 16.061 44.58 
Number of individuals 
with a bachelor 
degree 
State-Year 599 902,793.4 1,051,393 47,880 7,004,432 
Population State-Year 599 5,637,151 6,171,149 478,447 36,300,000 
Real per capita 
personal income 
State-Year 599 16.576 2.609 11.271 26.94 
Housing price index State-Year 599 2.612 1.027 1.200 7.142 
Average state tax State-Year 599 3.055 1.601 0 6.210 
Average corporate tax State-Year 599 15.411 1.518 11.730 19.290 
Party of the governor 
is democrat 
State-Year 599 0.414 0.484 0 1 
Share of democrats in 
the state senate 
State-Year 599 0.507 0.158 0.0857 0.92 
Share of democrats in 
the state house 
State-Year 599 0.510 0.155 0.129 0.881 
 
Table 4: The Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on State-Level Patenting  
DV: Logged Number of Patents at the State-Level 
Model: Panel OLS with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Legalization of same-sex civil unions  
0.062 
(0.031) 
(P=0.050) 
  
Legalization of medical marijuana  
0.068 
(0.033) 
(P=0.046) 
 
Number of abortion restrictions   
-0.011 
(0.005) 
(P=0.024) 
    
Lagged Patenting Rate (logged) 0.574 
(0.046) 
0.562 
(0.033) 
0.569 
(0.046) 
    
Logged Business R&D Expenditure (lagged) 0.081 
0.039 
0.075 
(0.039) 
0.083 
(0.038) 
    
Logged State Expenditure (lagged) 0.170 
(0.122) 
0.209 
(0.127) 
0.202 
(0.129) 
    
Share Of Education Expenditure (lagged) -0.000 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
    
Logged number of Bachelor degrees (lagged) 0.034 
(0.066) 
0.045 
(0.067) 
0.033 
(0.067) 
    
Logged population 0.148 
(0.232) 
0.022 
(0.226) 
0.090 
(0.235) 
    
Real per capita personal income 0.012 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.014) 
    
Housing price index -0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
    
State tax -13.169 
(11.270) 
-15.440 
(10.962) 
-14.869 
(11.334) 
    
Corporate tax 8.941 
(12.979) 
11.022 
(12.651) 
10.263 
(13.063) 
    
Governor is democrat -0.001 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
    
Share of democrats in the state senate -0.115 
(0.122) 
-0.155 
(0.113) 
-0.108 
(0.122) 
    
Share of democrats in the state house 0.144 
(0.128) 
0.102 
(0.125) 
0.071 
(0.124) 
    
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Number of states 50 50 50 
Observations 599 599 599 
R-Squared 0.850 0.852 0.850 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged number of patents in each state-year. "Legalization of same-sex civil unions" and 
"Legalization of medical marijuana" are indicator variables that equal to 1 after the state implements the policy change. 
“Number of abortion restrictions” is a count measure of the number of abortion restrictions in each state-year. All specifications 
include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  
Table 5: The Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on Cross-State Mobility  
DV: Mobility of Top Inventors to State Mobility of Individuals to State 
Model: Panel OLS with state-pair fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Difference in the 
legalization of same-
sex civil unions 
between the focal state 
and the paired state 
-0.142 
(0.097) 
(P=0.143) 
  
-86.021 
(46.968) 
(P=0.067) 
  
       
Difference in the 
legalization of medical 
marijuana between the 
focal state and the 
paired state 
 
-0.058 
(0.044) 
(P=0.186) 
  
67.227 
(21.743) 
(P=0.002) 
 
       
Difference in the 
number of abortion 
restrictions between the 
focal state and the 
paired state 
  
-0.042 
(0.020) 
(P=0.040) 
  
10.478 
(11.218) 
(P=0.350) 
       
Full set of controls for 
both sates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
State-pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of state-pairs 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 
Observations 29,302 29,302 29,302 29,230 29,230 29,230 
R-Squared 0.155 0.155 0.156 0.048 0.048 0.048 
Notes: In models 1 to 3, mobility is defined as the number of top inventors that move to the focal state from 
the paired state in year t. In models 4 to 6, mobility is defined as the number of individuals that move to the 
focal state from the paired state in year t (based on tax data). The independent variables capture the difference 
in the legalization state of the focal state and the paired state. All specifications include state-pair and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  
 
 
  
Table 6: The Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on State-Level Openness 
DV: Share of local citations 
Time gap between patents and 
cited prior arts 
Model: Panel OLS with state fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legalization of same-
sex civil unions  
0.009 
(0.005) 
(P=0.065) 
  
-340.206 
(197.542) 
(P=0.091) 
  
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
 
0.007 
(0.003) 
(P=0.016) 
  
-111.856 
(60.846) 
(P=0.072) 
 
Number of abortion 
restrictions 
  
-0.000 
(0.001) 
(P=0.780) 
  
14.736 
(11.798) 
(P=0.218) 
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Observations 599 599 599 599 599 599 
R-Squared 0.113 0.114 0.105 0.850 0.843 0.550 
Notes: Share of local citations for a patent is defined as the ratio of the number of citations to patents by at least 
one inventor in the same city over the total number of citations. The share of local citations at the state level in 
a year is the mean of the share of local citations for all patents filed in that state in that year. Time gap between 
a patent and its cited prior arts is calculated as the average number of days between the focal patent’s application 
date and the application dates of the cited patents by the focal patent. The time gap between patents and cited 
prior arts at the state level in a year is equivalent to the mean of time gap for all patents filed in the state in that 
year. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
 
Table 7: The Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on Incumbent Inventors’ Patenting 
DV: Logged Patent Count 
Model: Panel OLS with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Legalization of same-sex civil unions  
0.029  
(0.006) 
(P=0.000) 
  
Legalization of medical marijuana  
0.045 
(0.007) 
(P=0.000) 
 
Number of abortion restrictions   
-0.001 
(0.000) 
(P=0.092) 
    
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Inventor and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Inventors 1,006,913 890,902 447,586 
Observations 8,395,661 7,509,846 5,327,600 
R-Squared 0.166 0.320 0.115 
Notes: This table examines the impact of liberalization policies on the patenting rate of incumbent inventors. 
All specifications include inventor and year fixed effects. All specifications include the inventor’s experience 
and the full set of state-level time varying controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  
 
Table 8: Impact of Liberalization Policies on Incumbent Inventors’ Collaboration Diversity 
DV: New Collaborative Ties Collaborators’ Knowledge Diversity 
Model: Panel OLS with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legalization of same-
sex civil unions  
0.072  
(0.010) 
(P=0.000) 
  
0.037 
(0.016) 
(P=0.026) 
  
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
 
0.053 
(0.012) 
(P=0.000) 
 
 0.161 
(0.024) 
(P=0.000) 
 
Number of abortion 
restrictions 
  
0.000 
(0.000) 
(P=0.133) 
  -0.003 
(0.004) 
(P=0.502) 
       
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inventor and year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Inventors 961,686 890,902 404,567 1,006,913 890,902 362,825 
Observations 7,388,748 7,509,846 4,854,435 8,395,661 7,872,671 4,353,587 
R-Squared 0.703 0.703 0.613 0.013 0.020 0.007 
Notes: New collaborative ties measure the number of new unique pair-wise collaborations for each inventor in 
each year. Collaborators’ knowledge diversity is calculated as the count of unique technological classes in 
which all collaborators on each patent have previously patented. All specifications include inventor and year 
fixed effects. All specifications include the inventor’s experience, inventor’s total number of collaborative ties, 
and the full set of state-level time varying controls.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state. 
 
Table 9: Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on Novel and Breakthrough Innovations 
DV: 
Share of Novel Subclass 
Recombinations 
Share of Patents in the Top 10% Highly 
Cited Patents 
Model: Panel OLS with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legalization of 
same-sex civil 
unions  
0.002 
(0.000) 
(P=0.000) 
  
0.001  
(0.002) 
(P=0.671) 
  
       
Legalization of 
medical marijuana 
 
0.003 
(0.001) 
(P=0.000) 
  
0.004 
(0.002) 
(P=0.058) 
 
       
Number of 
abortion 
restrictions 
  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
(P=0.488) 
  
-0.001 
(0.000) 
(P=0.000) 
       
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inventor and year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Inventors 
1,006,913 890,902 404,567 977,121 890,902 404,567 
Observations 8,395,661 7,509,846 4,854,435 8,280,528 7,509,846 4,854,435 
R-Squared 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.019 0.015 0.006 
Notes: The share of novel recombinations is the share of novel subclass pairs out of total subclass pairs assigned 
to each inventor’s patents in a year. Share of patents in the top 10% highly cites patents is the logged number 
of patents that fall into the top 10% highly cited patents at the inventor level. All specifications include inventor 
and year fixed effects and controls for inventor’s experience, inventor’s number of patents, and the full set of 
state-level time varying controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  
Table 10: Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on the Number of Patenting Organizations 
DV: Logged Number of Patenting Organizations 
Model: Panel OLS with state fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Legalization of same-sex civil 
unions  
0.085 
(0.029) 
(P=0.006) 
  
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
 
0.117 
(0.033) 
(P=0.001) 
 
Number of abortion 
restrictions 
  
-0.014 
(0.005) 
(P=0.005) 
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes 
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 50 50 50 
Observations 599 599 599 
R-Squared 0.788 0.798 0.789 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged number of patenting organizations per state per year. All 
specifications include state and year fixed effects, and the full set of state-level time varying controls. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by state.  
 
Table 11: Impact of Social Liberal Policies on Patenting Rate by Organization Size 
DV: Logged patenting rate (organization-level) 
Model: Panel OLS with organization fixed effects 
 (1) (2) 
Legalization of same-sex civil unions  
0.187 
(0.008) 
(P=0.000) 
 
   
Legalization of same-sex civil unions × Logged size of 
patent stock at the time of policy implementation  
-0.155 
(0.008) 
(P=0.000) 
 
   
Legalization of medical marijuana  
0.165 
(0.005) 
(P=0.000) 
   
Legalization of medical marijuana × Logged size of 
patent stock at the time of policy implementation 
 
-0.130 
(0.003) 
(P=0.000) 
Number of abortion restrictions   
   
Full set of controls Yes Yes 
Organization and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of Organizations 180,296 195,390 
Observations 1,640,750 1,572,346 
R-Squared 0.032 0.027 
Notes: We use the size of patent stock at the time of policy change as a proxy for the organization size. Only 
organizations whose first patent was filed before policy enactment are included. All specifications include 
organization and year fixed effects, and the full set of state-level time varying controls. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by state. 
 
  
Tables A1 to A5 and Figures A1 to A4 are available in the online appendix.  
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Table A1: Hazard rate of the implementation of social liberalization policies  
 
Hazard ratio of the legalization of same-sex 
civil unions and domestic partnerships 
Hazard ratio of the 
legalization of medical 
marijuana 
 (1) (2) 
State-level patenting 
(logged) 
0.952 
(0.352) 
(P=0.894) 
0.821 
(0.235) 
(P=0.492) 
Observations 640 601 
   
Number of failures  
(cross-state moving) 
7 11 
   
Log pseudolikelihood -27.098 -41.862 
Note: The table presents the hazard ratio likelihood of the passage of each social liberalization policy in our sample 
in in a state based on the state’s patenting rate. Both models are estimated using Cox hazard regression with robust 
standard errors clustered at the state level.  
 
Table A2: The Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on Inflow and Outflow of Top Inventors 
DV: 
Number of Top Inventors Moving to the 
State 
Number of Top Inventors 
Leaving the State 
Model: Panel OLS with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legalization of same-sex 
civil unions  
-58.490 
(50.571) 
(P=0.253) 
  
-33.626 
(44.146) 
(P=0.450) 
  
       
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
 
35.362 
(10.958) 
(P=0.002) 
  
38.373 
(7.765) 
(P=0.000) 
 
       
Number of abortion 
restrictions 
  
-11.399 
(5.574) 
(P=0.046) 
  
-6.076 
(4.524) 
(P=0.185) 
       
       
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Number of states 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Observations 599 599 599 599 599 599 
R-Squared 0.514 0.508 0.528 0.547 0.560 0.550 
Notes: "Legalization of same-sex civil unions" and "Legalization of medical marijuana" are indicator variables 
that equal to 1 after the state implements the policy change. “Number of abortion restrictions” is a count measure 
of the number of abortion restrictions in each state-year. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  
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Table A3: Hazard rate of moving due to liberalization policies at the individual level 
DV: Hazard ratio of mobility Hazard ratio of mobility 
Sample: 
Inventors with their first patent filed 
before 1995 
All inventors with their first patent 
filed before 2006 
Model: Cox Regression Cox Regression 
 (1) (2) 
Residing in a treated 
state 
-0.053 
(P= 0.629) 
-0.059 
(P=0.530) 
Observations 616,645 1,224,373 
   
Number of failures  
(cross-state moving) 
19,123 25,394 
   
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
-192.316.07 -345,304.96 
   
Note: This table estimates the hazard ratio likelihood of cross-state mobility based on whether inventors reside in 
states that passed either of the two social liberalization policies compared to whether inventors reside in other 
states. The dependent variable (i.e., failure) is defined as 1 if the inventor makes a cross-state movement. The time 
to move is right-truncated at the end of the sample. Model 1 only includes inventors whose first patent is filed 
before 1995. Model 2 includes all inventors whose first patent is filed before 2006 (i.e., the last year in our sample). 
Both models are estimated using Cox Hazard model with robust standard errors clustered at the state level.  
 
Table A4: The Impact of Social-Liberalization Policies on the Net Flow of Educated Individuals 
DV: Net Mobility of Educated Individuals to the State (thousands) 
Model: Panel OLS with state fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Legalization of same-sex civil 
unions  
-32.533 
(45.062) 
(P=0.474) 
  
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
 
-18.840 
(14.106) 
(P=0.188) 
 
Number of abortion restrictions   
-1.545 
(2.607) 
(P=0.556) 
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of states 50 50 50 
Observations 549 549 549 
R-Squared 0.178 0.177 0.175 
Notes: Net mobility is defined as the difference between the number of individuals that move to the state and 
the number of individuals that move away from the state. "Legalization of same-sex civil unions" and 
"Legalization of medical marijuana" are indicator variables that equal to 1 after the state implements the policy 
change. “Number of abortion restrictions” is a count measure of the number of abortion restrictions in each 
state-year. All specifications include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by state.  
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Table A5: The Impact of Liberalization Policies Based on Acceptance of Social Issue 
DV: 
Logged Number of Patents at the State-
Level 
Model: Panel OLS with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) 
Legalization of same-sex civil unions  
-0.090  
(0.063) 
 
   
Legalization of same-sex civil unions * Logged crime rate 
based on sexual orientation 
0.168 
(0.066) 
 
   
Legalization of medical marijuana  
0.200 
(0.040) 
   
Legalization of medical marijuana * Ballot vote for medical 
marijuana legalization 
 
-0.305 
(0.098) 
   
   
Full set of controls Yes Yes 
   
State and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Number of Inventors 49 47 
Observations 587 563 
R-Squared 0.961 0.962 
Notes: This table estimates the impact of the three policies on state-level patenting based on variation in 
acceptance of the social issue underlying the policy. The dependent variable is the logged number of patents in 
each state-year. In the case of medical marijuana legalization, the issue was put to ballot vote in the majority 
of states (eight out of eleven). In our estimations we exclude the three states that passed the legalization laws 
through senate and house voting. In the cases of the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic 
partnerships, and the passage of additional abortion restrictions, the policy changes have been largely passed 
through senate and house voting where votes are along party lines. This makes senate and house voting less 
useful for our identification strategy. Instead, we proxy for the level of social acceptance of same-sex civil 
unions and domestic partnerships using FBI data on hate crimes based on sexual orientation. We assume lower 
rates of hate crime based on sexual orientation indicate more acceptance of same-sex marriage. Alternatively, 
higher crime rates show higher resistance against the issue and potentially more room for the policy to have an 
effect. We use the crime rates at the time of policy change for treated states. For the control states, we use the 
crime rates in 2010. The latter is not important because of the inclusion of state fixed effects. We cannot use 
this strategy in the case of abortion restrictions since there are multiple treatments for a state over time. All 
specifications include state and year fixed effects and the full set of state-level time varying controls. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by state.  
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Figure A1- Mediating Role of Public Opinion in the Impact of the Social Policies on State-Level 
Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figures A1 to A4 presents mediation analyses. The intent of these exercises is not show causality but to 
demonstrate a more fine-grained depiction of steps between the policies and our outcomes of interest. Path a 
shows the direct effect of each policy on liberal views of individuals. Path b shows the direct effect of liberal 
views of individuals on state-level patenting. Path ab shows the indirect effect of each policy on state-level 
patenting rate through changing the liberal views of individuals. Path c shows the direct effect of each policy on 
state-level patenting. The mediation results are estimated using generalized structural modelling in Stata 14.   
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
State-level 
patenting rate 
Liberal views of 
individuals 
(based on Enns and 
Koch) 
c=0.012 
(p=0.000) 
a=0.035 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.323 (p=0.000) 
ab=0.011 (p=0.042) 
 
Passage of additional 
abortion restrictions 
State-level 
patenting rate 
Liberal views of 
individuals 
(based on Enns and 
Koch) 
c=-0.020 
(p=0.105) 
a=-0.004 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.401 (p=0.005) 
ab=-0.002 (p=0.022) 
 
Legalization of same-
sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships 
State-level 
patenting rate 
Liberal views of 
individuals 
(based on Enns and 
Koch) 
c=0.098 
(p=0.009) 
a=0.025 
(p=0.022) 
b=0.415 (p=0.004) 
ab=0.010 (p=0.073) 
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Figure A2- Mediating Role of Collaboration Diversity in the Impact of the Legalization of Same-Sex Civil 
Unions on Incumbent Inventors’ Patenting Rate, Share of Novel Recombinations, and Share of 
Breakthrough Innovation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Path a in each graph shows the direct effect of the legalization of same-sex civil unions and domestic 
partnerships on incumbent inventors’ share of new collaborative ties. Path b in each graph shows the direct effect 
of incumbent inventors’ share of new collaborative ties on each outcome of interest. Path ab in each graph shows 
the indirect effect of the policy on the outcome of interest through changing incumbent inventors’ share of new 
collaborative ties. Similarly, path a’ in each graph shows the direct effect of the policy on the knowledge diversity 
of incumbent inventors’ collaborators. Path b’ in each graph shows the direct effect of the knowledge diversity of 
incumbent inventors’ collaborators on the outcomes of interest. Path a’b’ in each graph shows the indirect effect 
of the policy on each outcome of interest through changing the knowledge diversity of incumbent inventors’ 
collaborators. Path c in each graph shows the direct effect of the policy on the outcomes of interest.  
Legalization of same-
sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships 
Collaborators’ 
knowledge diversity 
Incumbent inventors’ 
share of breakthrough 
innovations 
Share of new 
collaborative ties 
c=-0.003 
(p=0.105) 
a=0.050 
(p=0.000) 
a'=0.035 
(p=0.115) 
b=0.093 (p=0.007) 
ab=0.005 (p=0.000) 
 
b'=0.010 (p=0.000) 
a'b'=0.000 (p=0.114) 
 
Legalization of same-
sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships 
Collaborators’ 
knowledge diversity 
Incumbent inventors’ 
share of novel 
recombinations 
Share of new 
collaborative ties 
c=0.001 
(p=0.035) 
a=0.050 
(p=0.000) 
a'=0.035 
(p=0.115) 
b=0.040 (p=0.000) 
ab=0.002 (p=0.000) 
 
b'=0.001 (p=0.000) 
a'b'=0.000 (p=0.112) 
 
Legalization of same-
sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships 
Collaborators’ 
knowledge diversity 
Incumbent inventors’ 
patenting rate 
Share of new 
collaborative ties 
c=0.006 
(p=0.006) 
a=0.050 
(p=0.000) 
a'=0.035 
(p=0.115) 
b=0.567 (p=0.000) 
ab=0.028 (p=0.000) 
 
b'=0.051 (p=0.000) 
a'b'=0.002 (p=0.113) 
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Figure A3- Mediating Role of Collaboration Diversity in the Impact of the Legalization of Medical 
Marijuana on Incumbent Inventors’ Patenting Rate, Share of Novel Recombinations, and Share of 
Breakthrough Innovation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Path a in each graph shows the direct effect of the legalization of medical marijuana on incumbent inventors’ 
share of new collaborative ties. Path b in each graph shows the direct effect of incumbent inventors’ share of new 
collaborative ties on each outcome of interest. Path ab in each graph shows the indirect effect of the policy on the 
outcome of interest through changing incumbent inventors’ share of new collaborative ties. Similarly, path a’ in 
each graph shows the direct effect of the policy on the knowledge diversity of incumbent inventors’ collaborators. 
Path b’ in each graph shows the direct effect of the knowledge diversity of incumbent inventors’ collaborators on 
the outcomes of interest. Path a’b’ in each graph shows the indirect effect of the policy on each outcome of interest 
through changing the knowledge diversity of incumbent inventors’ collaborators. Path c in each graph shows the 
direct effect of the policy on the outcomes of interest.  
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
Collaborators’ 
knowledge diversity 
Incumbent inventors’ 
patenting rate 
Share of new 
collaborative ties 
c=0.009 
(p=0.035) 
a=0.043 
(p=0.000) 
a'=0.162 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.571 (p=0.000) 
ab=0.025 (p=0.000) 
 
b'=0.053 (p=0.000) 
a'b'=0.009 (p=0.112) 
 
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
Collaborators’ 
knowledge diversity 
Incumbent inventors’ 
share of breakthrough 
innovations 
Share of new 
collaborative ties 
c=-0.003 
(p=0.001) 
a=0.043 
(p=0.000) 
a'=0.162 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.084 (p=0.000) 
ab=0.004 (p=0.000) 
 
b'=0.011 (p=0.000) 
a'b'=0.002 (p=0.000) 
 
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
Collaborators’ 
knowledge diversity 
Incumbent inventors’ 
share of novel 
recombinations 
Share of new 
collaborative ties 
c=0.000 
(p=0.321) 
a=0.043 
(p=0.000) 
a'=0.162 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.041 (p=0.000) 
ab=0.002 (p=0.000) 
 
b'=0.001 (p=0.000) 
a'b'=0.000 (p=0.000) 
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Figure A4- Mediating Role of Public Opinion in the Impact of the Social Policies on the Number of 
Patenting Organizations 
 
 
 
Legalization of same-
sex civil unions and 
domestic partnerships 
State-level 
patenting rate 
Liberal views of 
individuals 
(based on Enns and 
Koch)  
c=0.060 
(p=0.169) 
a=0.046 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.403 (p=0.001) 
ab=0.018 (p=0.005) 
 
Legalization of medical 
marijuana 
State-level 
patenting rate 
Liberal views of 
individuals 
 
c=0.139 
(p=0.000) 
a=0.047 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.235 (p=0.016) 
ab=0.011 (p=0.033) 
 
Passage of additional 
abortion restrictions 
State-level 
patenting rate 
Liberal views of 
individuals 
 
c=--0.016 
(p=0.008) 
a=--0.009 
(p=0.000) 
b=0.346 (p=0.008) 
ab=-0.003 (p=0.030) 
 
